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ABSTRACT 
The paper considers the nature and scale of the benefits and costs of 
gambling, with special reference to machine gaming. Although the industry is 
argued to be unlikely to have a significant macroeconomic impact, evidence is 
consistent with it generating considerable benefits to individual (responsible) 
consumers, whether measured by consumer surplus or through the pattern of 
responses to a wellbeing question. At the same time, a minority of users of 
gaming facilities, problem gamblers, appear to make consistently flawed 
decisions such that those with gambling disorder experience exceptionally 
low wellbeing.  Public policy and regulatory decisions should consider the 
effects, on the margin, on both the net benefits to recreational gamblers and 
the net costs to problem gamblers. Many policy decisions may involve a 
trade-off between the welfare of recreational gamblers and the welfare of 
problem gamblers. Contemporary interest in targeted policies appears to 
represent an attempt to avoid the need to confront such a trade-off by 
searching for policies which are aimed very explicitly at problem gamblers 




Almost always and everywhere, legislators and regulators have placed 
severe restrictions on the supply of commercial gambling services. Often the 
regulation is extreme to the point of legal prohibition, of gambling in general 
or of particular gambling activities. Thus, even after more than thirty years of 
an international trend towards liberalisation1, commercial gambling, other 
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1
 For example, the lotto game was adopted in almost all jurisdictions in the developed 
and some in the less developed world during the 1980s and 1990s; in the United 
States, the number of states with legal casinos increased from 3 in 1980 to 33 now; 
over the period, even Singapore introduced first lottery games, then football betting, 
latterly two world class casinos. Sauer (2001) detected historical long swings in 
societal attitudes to gambling, similarly as in the cases of alcohol and tobacco, and 
dated the start of a swing back to liberalisation around 1980. 
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than on state lotteries, remains totally forbidden in Mainland China while 
sports betting is still illegal in nearly all of the United States. 
Relative to most other parts of the World, the United Kingdom currently 
offers a more liberal environment for the gambling industries. An exception is 
that large-scale, machines-focused casinos, such as have proved popular and 
successful in many parts of the United States and in other regions outside 
Europe, have not been authorised in the United Kingdom. But, otherwise, all 
major forms of gambling are available, to adults, through a range of dedicated 
venues, such as racetracks, betting shops, (small-scale) casinos, bingo halls 
and amusement arcades. Additional gaming opportunities are to be had at 
machines found in locations such as pubs and airports. Further, and unusually 
for Europe, residents are free legally to access and play on gambling websites 
wherever in the World they are situated. 
Nevertheless, while availability of gambling is indeed widespread in 
Britain, restrictions still apply. In respect of gaming machines, there are 
regulatory limits on stakes and prizes and particularly severe constraints on 
numbers of gaming machines permitted in individual casinos (20) and 
individual betting shops (4). There is almost no research on the consequences, 
including any unintended consequences, of this array of restrictions. 
That restricting gambling has been, and continues even now to be, the 
typical stance of governments in all parts of the World, including Britain, 
suggests that this is no normal product. On the one hand, where it is available, 
whether legally or not, its popularity indicates that large numbers of people 
enjoy the entertainment it gives them. On the other hand, restrictionist policies 
are found even in economically liberal societies, which in other spheres 
typically favour freedom of choice on the presumption that individuals are the 
best judges of their own welfare. Across the World, there therefore appears to 
be a strong current of opinion that gambling is „exceptional‟ and has special 
characteristics which mean that significant numbers in the population would, 
unrestrained by restrictions, take systematically poor and self-harming 
decisions about their levels of consumption. 
Underpinning this Review is an acceptance that both perspectives are 
legitimate. The substantial take-up of gambling opportunities by large 
numbers of individuals who consume gambling products, with no evidence of 
harm or regret, is taken as suggestive of a flow of benefits, possibly very 
large, from the availability of gambling. Evidence of harm, sometimes 
serious, to a minority of consumers indicates that there is indeed potential for 
flawed decision-taking to lead some people to levels and patterns of 
consumption that will later be regretted. As in other areas of government, 
reasoned public policy must consider both the gainers and the losers, both the 
benefits and the costs associated with an industry, and how these benefits and 
costs might change under different policy scenarios. This Review therefore 
begins by inquiring into the nature of the economic and social benefits and 




costs of commercial gambling.2 While the Review is most focused on machine 
gaming, many of the points and arguments in the debate are necessarily 
generic and therefore apply to gambling products more generally. 
 
2 THE NATURE AND SCALE OF THE BENEFITS FROM 
GAMBLING 
 
2.1 Economic impact 
 
Lobbyists looking to win fiscal or regulatory concessions from 
government for any industry tend to emphasise the contributions the industry 
makes to national income and employment.3 In the case of gambling, the 
industry scarcely qualifies as one of the commanding heights of the economy, 
for example it is thinly represented in the FTSE-100 list of companies with 
the highest asset values. Nevertheless, it accounts for significant consumer 
expenditure and employs significant numbers of people. 
Expenditure on gambling is measured by Gross Gambling Yield (GGY), 
which is the amount per period that operators win from their customers. This, 
rather than the amount staked by customers, is the appropriate measure of 
expenditure since it is the amount left behind by users of the service after they 
have used it. It is the equivalent, for example, of box office revenue at 
cinemas, which is also the amount customers leave behind. 
Latest data from the UK Gambling Commission (2012) for those parts of 
the gambling industry it regulated4 relate to the financial year 2011-12. 
Industry GGY amounted to £5.8b of which £2.2b was generated by machine 
gaming.  
Even once National Lottery expenditure (£3.1b GGY in 2011-12)  is 
added, total GGY of gambling accounted for only 0.93% of consumer 
expenditure and approximately 0.6%  of GDP5, making the industry 
proportionately less economically important than in, say, Canada , the United 
States or Australia. Indeed, notwithstanding its much smaller population, 
expenditure on machine gaming in Australia was much higher in absolute 
                                                     
2
 Debate in Britain does not extend to proposals to restrict legal gambling to the point 
where a significant illegal sector would be expected to develop. The review therefore 
abstracts from what, in many jurisdictions, would be the principal benefit of 
liberalisation of commercial gambling, namely the avoidance of economic and social 
costs associated with supply otherwise being from criminal organisations.   
3 
Governments in turn may have an interest in the potential gain in tax revenue from 
gambling privilege taxes (the term refers to extra taxes on the product over and above 
those, such as value added tax, levied on products generally). 
4
 Its jurisdiction did not extend to National Lottery products and spread betting, 
regulated in the period by the National Lottery Commission and the Financial 
Services Authority respectively. 
5
 Lottery GGY from National Lottery Commission Annual Report, 2012, Appendix 
A, consumer expenditure and GDP data from the Office for National Statistics. 
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terms than that in Great Britain (the sterling equivalent of more than £7b per 
year) at the time of the Report from the Australian Productivity Commission 
(2010). Similarly, casinos, dominated by machine gaming, have overtaken 
lotteries as the largest sector of the gambling industry in America and 
account, in an arithmetic sense, for the fact that gambling is a proportionately 
larger component of the American than of the British economy. Such 
international comparisons between countries with relatively similar cultures 
suggest that variations in the size of the gambling sector are driven, to an 
important extent, by what is permitted to be offered and it appears plausible 
that consumers in Britain would choose to spend significantly more of their 
income on gambling than at present if restrictions on machine gaming in or 
outside casinos were as low as in many American and Australian states.  
In terms of employment, Gambling Commission (2012) estimated that 
there were 110,000 full- or part-time employees in the sectors it regulated, 
which is approximately 0.38% of total employment in the whole economy. Of 
these, 54,000 were in betting, 18,000 in amusement arcades, 15,000 in bingo 
and 14,000 in casinos. A further 6,000 were employed by gaming machine 
suppliers.6 
To an extent, this break-down of jobs by sector conceals the true 
contribution of machine gaming to employment. In both betting and bingo 
venues, revenue from machines exceeded revenue from the supposedly core 
activity which defines the sector. Thus, GGY in betting shops in 2011-12 was 
£1.39b from betting and £1.45b from machines. In bingo halls, GGY was 
£133m from main stage bingo and £230m from machines. There can therefore 
be little doubt that many betting shops and bingo halls, and the jobs they 
support, are viable only given the revenue generated by machines. Similarly, 
given that social trends are driving many public houses to close, it is possible 
that some surviving jobs in that sector, outside gambling, are also dependent 
on machine gaming. 
So, the number of jobs associated with gambling activities in general and 
machine gaming in particular is non-trivial. But should the economic and 
social value of the industry be equated with its arithmetic contribution to GDP 
or to total employment? The answer from economics is „no‟. To be sure, in an 
austere economic climate such as Britain currently faces, changes in 
regulation with the potential to eliminate or create jobs in the sector might 
decrease or increase aggregate employment in the short-run given slack in 
some local labour markets. But regulatory arrangements are for the long-term 
and are appropriately designed according to long-run benefits and costs from 
different policy scenarios. In this context, neither the contribution of gambling 
to GDP nor its contribution to aggregate employment should be counted as a 
societal economic benefit. This is because there is no convincing case for 
believing that the industry creates additional output and additional 
                                                     
6
 In all cases, employment figures have been rounded here to the nearest thousand to 
facilitate ease of reading.  




employment. Everyone faces a budget constraint. In the long-run, the 
proportion of household income that is spent rather than saved exhibits no 
strong trend. Therefore, if the gambling industry were permitted to grow by 
easing of regulatory constraints, it is likely that the increase in consumer 
expenditure/ employment would simply displace expenditure/ employment in 
other sectors of the economy. Similarly, if the industry were forced to 
contract, expenditure would be expected to be switched to other goods and 
services, leaving aggregate income and employment in the economy 
unchanged. Hence, even leaving aside that its share in overall economic 
activity is modest, it is unconvincing to argue that the current or any future, 
larger gambling industry would generate benefits at the macroeconomic 
level.7  
This conclusion is not universally applicable. Eadington (1999) argued 
that whether casino developments in individual cities, regions or countries 
could increase aggregate output and employment depended on their potential 
to export their services. If the clientele were just local, expenditure would 
simply be diverted from other goods and services, such as alternative 
entertainments. In this case, net job creation would be unlikely.8  However, if 
the casino development attracted new visitors from outside the area, their 
expenditure would be additional rather than displaced and this could increase 
the size of the economy. Thus Las Vegas and Macau developed historically 
by supplying gambling services which attracted expenditure from large 
neighbouring jurisdictions where the provision of such services was 
prohibited. At first, local structural unemployment was mopped up; and in the 
long-run the growing gambling industry was enabled by substantial inward 
migration that allowed additional jobs to be filled. The same scenario was 
followed in the case of some of the casinos on Native American reservations. 
But the model has low applicability to Britain at the national level where 
(aside from a small number of specialist London casinos catering to 
international high rollers) there are no gambling facilities of a size likely to 
draw additional visitors who travel specifically to gamble. 
Rejection of the proposition that the gambling industry increases national 
output and employment does not, however, imply that the sector is without 
economic value. Even if the total output of goods and services is the same 
under two different scenarios, economic welfare is higher if the composition 
of that output under one of the scenarios better matches the consumption 
                                                     
7
 The influential Report from the Australian Productivity Commission (2010)  reached 
similar conclusions from specific research it commissioned: “The gambling industries 
do not create net employment benefits, because they divert employment from one part 
of the economy to another” (p. 6.1); “longer-term employment effects of the gambling 
industry are likely to be negligible” (Overview, p.10).  
8
 There may be a minor impact to the extent that different goods and services exhibit 
different degrees of labour intensity. For example, if large scale machine gaming 
facilities are capital-intensive and capture expenditure from more labour-intensive 
local restaurants, there may be a fall in the total number of jobs.     
THE JOURNAL OF GAMBLING BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 
2013,  7 3 
 
6 
preferences of the population, allowing them to derive more satisfaction from 
the goods and services that are available.  
It is the conclusion of this section that gambling is unlikely to raise GDP 
and the level of income in the society. Rather, any benefits from permitting 
gambling are likely to be consumption benefits. Availability of gambling 
products expands consumer choice and allows consumers as a group to extract 
more satisfaction from the income available to them as a group.  
 
2.2 Consumption of gambling products 
 
It is a presumption of traditional welfare economics that individuals are 
the best judges of their own welfare because only they know the intensity of 
the satisfaction that they experience from the act of consuming each good. 
They will allocate their limited budgets between goods in order to maximise 
the total satisfaction they obtain for the amounts spent. If an additional good is 
made available, some will judge that switching part of their expenditure to the 
new good will not increase their total satisfaction. They will be non-users and 
will be no better or worse off than before. Others will judge that reallocating 
some of their budget to the new good will increase the satisfaction they gain 
from their overall budget. They will become purchasers of the new product 
and will be better off than before. They are said, by their purchase of the new 
good, to have revealed their preference for the new good. Welfare economics 
attempts to value how much better off they are through analysis of the demand 
for the additional good (of which more below). 
A large proportion of British adults reveal at least some preference for 
gambling services by choosing to allocate part of their budget to gambling 
products. The British Gambling Prevalence Survey, 2010 (BGPS) was the 
most recent large-scale exercise to collect information on participation among 
residents (aged 16 or above). 73% of respondents had gambled for money in 
the preceding twelve months. Discounting purchases of National Lottery 
tickets, gambling had still attracted a majority (56%) of respondents. 13% of 
all respondents had played on slot machines. 
It is of interest how these figures compare with participation-rates in other 
leisure activities. Taking Part was an annual survey of the use of leisure time 
in England, conducted for the Department for Culture, Media and Sports. 
Using the 2010 edition to ensure comparability with BGPS, some past- year 
participation-rates were: 69% for eating out in restaurants, 48% for going to 
pubs, bars or clubs, 48% for cinema attendance and 39% for using a public 
library. Relative to other leisure pursuits and entertainments that are 
considered mainstream, gambling therefore attracted a similar or higher level 
of participation across the population. 
Most of those who had gambled exhibited no signs that they were 
gambling in any sense irresponsibly. The BGPS administered (to all 
respondents who reported having gambled in the preceding twelve months) 
two screens in common usage, internationally, for identifying problem 




gambling. The screens pose questions to detect patterns of behaviour 
associated with either dependence on gambling or harm from gambling. The 
DSM-IV screen has ten questions and the score can range from 0-10. A 
threshold of 3 is used to classify a subject as a problem gambler. The PGSI 
screen has nine questions and the score can range from 0-27. A threshold of 8 
is used to classify a subject as a problem gambler. 
A large majority of past-year gamblers (87.2%) and more than two-thirds 
of slots players (68.4%) scored zero on both screens, indicating that they 
displayed no indications of suffering any degree of dependence on, or harm 
from, gambling.9 Note that a somewhat extreme requirement is being adopted 
here for gambling to be regarded as „responsible‟.10 For example, Question 1 
of the PGSI asks respondents whether they have bet more than they could 
afford to lose in the preceding twelve months (never/ sometimes/ most of the 
time/ almost always). A respondent who answered „sometimes‟, but who 
answered „never‟ to each of the other eight questions, would score 1 on the 
screen. Such a respondent would not qualify, with our extreme criterion, as a 
„responsible gambler‟ even if he scored zero on the DSM-IV screen and even 
though this set of responses would not normally be interpreted as a cause for 
concern. But the extremity of the criterion here for defining a gambler as 
„responsible‟ serves only to underline that a very large majority of British 
gamblers indeed play responsibly. There therefore appears to be no obvious 
reason to doubt that their decisions over how much of their budget to allocate 
to gambling are taken without being distorted by addiction or by having 
developed unhealthy attitudes to gambling. Spending money on gambling 
may then be taken as a „rational‟ decision, signalling that they expect to gain 
additional satisfaction compared with a counter-factual situation where 
gambling was unavailable and the portion of budgets allocated to gambling 
had to be dedicated instead to less preferred goods and services. This gain in 
satisfaction is the consumption benefit of gambling. In welfare economics, 
consumption benefit is measured by consumer surplus, which is a concept 
employed in cost-benefit analysis across a very wide range of spheres of 
public policy. 
 
                                                     
9
 Data from the BGPS quoted above were drawn from the official Report (Wardle et 
al., 2011). Those here and below are own calculations from the data set as 
downloaded from the UK Data Archive.  
10
 If the qualification for „responsible gambler‟ were the more conventional one that 
the respondent scored below the threshold for „problem gambler‟ on both screens, the 
proportions would increase to 98.6% for past year gamblers and 95.3% for past year 
slots players. 
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2.3 The concept of consumer surplus11 
 
Suppose, using a story to illustrate the concept, I live in a village with a 
restaurant. How often I eat there depends on the price it charges for a dinner. 
So long as the price is no more than £30, I will go there once a month. It 
would be a treat and I place a value of £30 on the satisfaction I anticipate from 
the occasion, hence my willingness-to-pay of £30.  
If the price were sufficiently lower, let us say £25, I would take two 
dinners per month: £25 is my willingness-to-pay for the second dinner. This is 
below my willingness-to-pay for the first dinner because the second would not 
have as much novelty value as before and I would expect to extract less 
satisfaction. 
By similar reasoning, my willingness-to-pay for a third dinner in the 
month is lower still, £20.   
As it happens, £20 is exactly the price the restaurant charges and so I am 
just induced to purchase three dinners per month. This is my „quantity 
demanded‟ at a price of £20. 
How much better off am I because there is a restaurant in the village? I am 
willing to pay £30 for the first dinner, which means that I expect to receive 
£30 worth of satisfaction. But I have to pay only the market price, £20. Hence 
I enjoy a „surplus‟ of £10 from the transaction. This is not a money flow but 
rather a valuation in money terms of my net consumption benefit from that 
first dinner. My willingness-to-pay for the second dinner is only £25, so the 
second visit delivers just £5 of „surplus‟. On the third dinner, I get no surplus 
at all since my willingness-to-pay this time is only £20: I expect to derive £20 
value (in terms of satisfaction) from the transaction but I have to hand over 
£20 to the proprietor, leaving me no better off for having made the third visit 
(i.e. I could have got the same satisfaction from spending that £20 on 
something else). So the marginal unit consumed does not deliver consumer 
surplus; but the infra-marginal units do.  
It is evident that the presence of the restaurant in the village is „worth‟£15 
per month to me because I eat there three times and the transactions together 
give me £15 (£10+£5+£0) of surplus. This is my „consumer surplus‟ and one 
way of thinking about it is that, if a licence were required to use the 
restaurant, it would be worth my while to buy a one-month licence at any 
price up to £15.  
Consumer surplus (here £15), rather than the revenue of the proprietor 
(here £60), is the measure used in welfare economics to assess the value of a 
facility to the consumer. It is formally defined as the excess of willingness-to-
pay over price. Note that, for it to be a valid measure, I, the consumer, would 
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 Consumer surplus has been at the centre of attempts to measure benefits from 
gambling. Given the importance of consumer surplus, this section provides a short 
account of the general concept. Readers who have followed a first-level course in 
economics will probably wish to skip to the next section.  




have to be rational and well-informed such that my willingness-to-pay was 
indeed an accurate evaluation of the satisfaction I would receive. Note also 
that the informational requirement for calculating consumer surplus is that the 
„demand curve‟ must be known or at least capable of being estimated with 
reasonable precision. A demand curve for a good shows how many units the 
consumer will purchase at each possible price. Here, the story has been told 
for one consumer; but aggregation across everyone in the village is 
straightforward and knowledge of the quantity-price relationship in the market 
as a whole would enable calculation of total consumer surplus for the village 
the restaurant serves.   
 
2.4 Application of consumer surplus to gambling 
 
For consumer surplus to be measured, the demand curve must be known 
or be estimated. A demand curve is represented pictorially with the price of 
the product on the vertical axis of a graph and the quantity of the product (per 
period) on the horizontal axis. But, compared with other goods, it is not so 
obvious what „price‟ and „quantity‟ mean in the context of gambling products. 
Australian Productivity Commission (1999) pioneered the use of 
consumer surplus as a way of evaluating benefits from gambling. It measured 
the quantity of gambling in terms of the number of dollars staked. It measured 
the price per unit stake as the amount retained by the operator rather than paid 
out as winnings (the take-out rate). With these definitions, price multiplied by 
quantity equals consumer expenditure (GGY), just as in, say, the restaurant 
industry. 
The demand curve is used to estimate how much consumer surplus would 
be generated per period. However, the data for estimating a demand curve is 
seldom adequate (for example, it is speculative how much quantity would 
change were price to change if there has been no recent experience of price 
change). Therefore the Australian Productivity Commission had to make a 
series of assumptions about the shape and steepness of the demand curve to 
calculate a range of estimates for the consumer surplus associated with each 
gambling activity. Each assumption is captured by a particular value for 
elasticity of demand. Elasticity is a measure of how much quantity demanded 
responds to price. For example, a value of -1 would signify that a change in 
price of -1% from its current value would induce a change in quantity 
demanded of +1%. If elasticity of demand were indeed -1, current price would 
be at exactly the level that maximises operators‟ revenue (here GGY). 
In the case where elasticity is -1, and assuming a linear demand curve, 
consumer surplus is exactly half of the industry‟s revenue (called, in the case 
of gambling, its GGY).12 The assumption of elasticity = -1 is therefore 
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 If elasticity is more elastic than -1 (high price sensitivity), consumer surplus is less 
than half of industry revenue. If it is less elastic than -1 (low price sensitivity), 
consumer surplus is more than half of industry revenue. The general formula for 
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convenient, as well as plausible, in the general case. However, a complication 
in the context of gambling is that the fundamental assumption behind 
consumer surplus, namely that individuals purchasing the product are rational 
and well-informed, is clearly violated to the extent that part of demand is from 
individuals (problem gamblers) who have lost control over their decisions in 
this sphere. Therefore it would be illegitimate to include their purchases in the 
demand curve to be employed for calculating consumer surplus. This is a 
practically very important complication since, while the proportion of 
consumers who could be regarded as problem gamblers may be very small, 
their typically heavy use will likely mean that they account for a high 
proportion of demand. Some adjustment in the calculations must therefore be 
made if estimates of consumer surplus are to command legitimacy. 
The adjustment made in the calculations in the first Australian 
Productivity Commission Report (1999) was somewhat convoluted. Separate 
demand curves were estimated for non-problem and problem gamblers. 
Problem gamblers were modelled as gaining positive consumer surplus in the 
usual way up to a „normal‟ level of consumption but negative surplus on units 
beyond what is normal (they are then getting less satisfaction than their 
willingness-to-pay given their decisions are now flawed).13 
Here, a more straightforward approach is taken in that we will be satisfied 
to estimate consumer surplus just for non-problem gamblers. Estimates for 
consumer surplus based on an elasticity of -1 can then be made using 
estimated current GGY from non-problem gamblers.  
Of course, total GGY is known from regulatory returns. But how much of 
this should be discounted because it derives from problem gamblers? The 
Productivity Commission, informed by research, adopted a different assumed 
proportion for each gambling activity; but 30% was its central estimate for 
gambling as a whole. Evidence for what proportion of the British industry‟s 
revenue derives from problem gamblers is based on imperfect data from 
BGPS questions on time and money spent. But best estimates, from Orford et 
al. (2013), are only a little lower than those from Australia. Below, it will be 
assumed that one-third of gambling revenue is from problem gamblers and 
this component of consumer expenditure will not be counted as a source of 
consumption benefit. 
Attempts to evaluate consumer surplus from gambling in Britain have 
been few. Farrell and Walker (1999) attributed considerable consumer surplus 
to National Lottery draws and considerable consumer surplus loss (close to 
£2b per year) from the presence of a 28 pence per ticket tax hypothecated to 
„good causes‟. This raised take-out by the operator and so suppressed demand. 
                                                                                                                              
calculation of consumer surplus is 0.5(GGY)/ε where ε is the absolute value of 
elasticity. 
13
 In the 2010 Report, the negative consumer surplus of problem gamblers was 
relabelled as part of social cost rather than being included as a (negative) component 
of aggregate consumer surplus. 




They argued that the levy for good causes was an inefficient tax since the loss 
to consumers was high relative to the sum raised. Crane (2008) forecast the 
consumer benefit from the extension in the availability of electronic gaming 
machines envisioned in the Gambling Act (2005). She based forecasts of 
usage on international experience and assumed that elasticity would be -1.3 
and that 30.3% of spend would be by problem gamblers. The analysis yielded 
an estimate of £3.2b per year of consumption benefit to recreational gamblers 
from the proposed network of new, more machines-focussed casinos (few of 
which have in fact actually appeared). This benefit was associated with a large 
projected increase in the proportion of household income spent on gambling 
products. 
It is beyond the scope of the current review to attempt to make detailed 
estimates of consumption benefit from gambling in Great Britain in the 
current gambling environment. Significant primary research would be 
required to investigate what were the appropriate assumptions to make in each 
sector concerning elasticity and the proportion of current GGY derived from 
problem gamblers. Nevertheless, rough illustrative calculations are possible to 
show the orders of magnitude likely to be involved. With the assumptions of a 
linear demand curve, an elasticity of -1, and one-third of GGY not to be 
counted because it comes from problem gamblers, the amount of consumer 
surplus generated by activities under the regulatory control of the Gambling 
Commission in 2011-12 would have been more than £1.9b. (of which 
machine gaming would have accounted for £0.7b). This is a „value of fun‟ 
equivalent, in terms of benefits to individuals, of giving every household in 
the country extra untaxed income of about £75 per year.14   
The rough estimate of aggregate consumption benefit here is substantial 
but somewhat lower, emphatically so in per capita terms, than the latest 
estimates produced for Australian Productivity Commission (2010), which 
were about £7b. sterling equivalent, even using „pessimistic‟ assumptions. 
Partly this is because lotteries (which accounted for about one-tenth of 
aggregate Australian GGY) are included in the Australian data whereas the 
British estimate is for only the Gambling Commission-regulated sector. 
Mainly, however, Australians‟ „fun‟ is valued more highly in total because 
they indulge in more of it. The proportion of household income devoted to 
gambling is much higher than in the United Kingdom. 
It is interesting to note that the Productivity Commission‟s estimates of 
consumption benefit, sector by sector, made for its 1999 Report, always 
exceeded even its most pessimistic assessments of social costs from problem 
                                                     
14
 For the economy, associated tax revenue would be an additional benefit: this is 
consumer surplus which does not accrue to consumers but rather is transferred to 
government. In 2011-12, gambling taxes on sectors regulated by the Gambling 
Commission yielded approximately £0.85b of which licences required for operation 
of gaming machines raised £0.2b (HM Revenue and Customs, Betting and Gaming 
Bulletin, June, 2013). 
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gambling. The results in the 2010 Report were broadly similar but consumer 
benefit, when calculated with the most pessimistic set of assumptions, fell 
short of social costs in the single case of the electronic gaming machines 
sector. 
Eadington (1999) remarked on a tendency to treat gamblers as „second 
class citizens‟. Public policy debate in the field is typically based on 
discussion of such issues as jobs and taxes, and of course on impacts on 
problem gambling. In other areas of public policy, there is typically an 
emphasis on consumer interests, yet many decisions on gambling policy 
ignore impacts on recreational gamblers altogether. The figures here indicate 
that the consumption value of gambling is very substantial and the implication 
is that evaluation of policy should include attempts to assess the extent to 
which this might be enhanced or eroded by any proposed policy initiatives. 
 
2.5 Wellbeing     
 
The argument to date has been conducted in terms of traditional welfare 
economics, which remains at the heart of analysis of policy by governments. 
However, the whole notion of consumer surplus may appear abstract to non-
economists. Moreover, perhaps there is more to life than consumption. 
There is an increasing interest in economics and other social sciences in 
the idea that public policy should be evaluated not with a relatively narrow 
focus on consumption benefits but with an eye to how policy affects general 
mental and physical wellbeing. Wellbeing appears to be an elusive concept 
and might be thought to be too hard to measure to be accorded centre stage in 
policy evaluation. However, faith has grown in the validity and usefulness of 
„happiness‟ data sets that have accumulated around the World over the last 
couple of decades. These data sets derive from asking large numbers of 
people how happy (sometimes how satisfied with life) they are „these days‟, 
on a numeric scale, such as 1 to 10. 
How reliable are answers to a happiness question in terms of truly 
measuring individual wellbeing?  Confidence in the validity of self-reported 
wellbeing measures is based on a number of findings over the decades.  
First, statistical modelling reveals intuitively plausible patterns in 
responses that are stable over space and time (Peiró, 2006). For example, 
marriage is consistently reported to raise expected happiness score by 0.6-0.8 
points on a ten point scale; and very bad rather than very good health is 
consistently reported to depress expected happiness score by about two full 
points. This suggests that, on average, people‟s answers are considered and 
sensible and that meaningful insights are likely to be obtained from including 
such as gambling behaviour in the modelling.  
Second, validation studies by psychologists have found that those 
reporting higher happiness scores are more likely to be rated as happy by 
others, engage more in spontaneous smiling and have lower incidence of 
various mental disorders (for detailed references, see Frey and Stutzer, 2002 




and Peiró, 2006). Outside the laboratory, the large-scale Israel Health Survey 
found that answers to its happiness question were strongly correlated with 
indicators for stress, depression and sleep problems (Romanov et al. 2012).  
Third, the medical literature provides evidence from longitudinal data that 
happiness score predicts future heart disease, stroke, suicide and longevity 
(see, for example, Koivumaa-Honkanen et al., 2000 and 2001, Diener and 
Chan, 2011). 
As evidence accumulated that happiness data capture meaningful 
information on people‟s wellbeing, interest grew in using insights from 
analysis of the data to inform public policy. Indeed, in an influential book, 
Layard (2005) argued that all government policy decisions should be 
evaluated in terms of expected impact on happiness, an idea consistent with 
the intuition that happiness, rather than, say, high consumption, is ultimately 
what people seek from their lives.  
The idea gained such currency that, in July 2011, the General Assembly of 
the United Nations passed a resolution requiring member states to gather data 
that would capture the importance of the pursuit of happiness “with a view to 
guiding their public policies”. In the preceding year, the new Government in 
the United Kingdom had already directed the Office for National Statistics to 
undertake a new regular survey of wellbeing that would provide data by 
which the state of the nation and its progress might be judged. 
Evidently sensing the zeitgeist, the Gambling Commission decided to add 
a happiness question to the 2010 BGPS. The exact question was:  “Taking all 
things together, on a scale of 1 to 10, how happy would you say you are these 
days?”15  For the first time, this would enable exploration of the relationship 
between subjective wellbeing and gambling behaviour. 
It is obvious that irresponsible gambling behaviour may have 
consequences that lower quality of life. But are there any prior reasons for 
suspecting that responsible gambling could possibly enhance wellbeing? To 
be sure, recreational gamblers appear to derive (as noted above) considerable 
consumption value from gambling. But this is because of their taste for this 
particular mode of entertainment. Others, with different tastes, presumably 
enjoy high consumption benefit from whatever other activities please them. 
So, just considering consumption benefit, there is no strong prior that the level 
of overall wellbeing of (responsible) gamblers will be different from the level 
of wellbeing of those in similar life circumstances who choose to spend their 
money on different things. 
On the other hand, gambling might conceivably deliver benefits beyond 
those of the entertainment value which players seek when they attend a venue. 
An analogy is that people may spend money on participating in sport just 
because it is, for them, an enjoyable entertainment. But it may have incidental 
                                                     
15 
The inclusion of “these days” is intended to encourage respondents towards an 
answer that captures their evaluation of their life as a whole rather than their mood 
that day. 
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effects on their health and wellbeing which they did not take into account in 
their purchasing decision and of which they may remain unaware. Then, sport 
would promote wellbeing, not just provide consumption benefit. 
Downs (2009) proposed that recreational gambling might enhance 
individuals‟ wellbeing by providing thrills, hope, escape, social interaction 
and a feeling of gaining control over one‟s own life, factors often regarded as 
contributing to a sense of wellbeing. For example, Abramson et al. (2000) 
found that even illusory control (such as, for example, one might observe 
among players on gaming machines) was effective in protecting against 
feelings of hopelessness and depression. Casey (2003) noted the importance 
of daydreams about winning the lottery in the daily lives of the group of low 
income women whom she studied. Again, interaction with others is widely 
regarded in the psychology literature as important to a feeling of satisfaction 
with life. Much gambling takes place in social settings. The bingo hall can 
provide its patrons with a sense of camaraderie. Casino players appear to 
value social contact with dealers and other players (Cotte and Latour, 2009). 
Even in machine gaming, an apparently asocial mode of gambling, groups 
may form to turn the activity into a collective rather than an individual 
experience (Cassidy, 2012). All these are aspects of gambling which accord 
with ideas in psychology about what makes for happiness.  
Forrest (2013) presents a statistical model which accounts for variations in 
happiness amongst the 7,721 BGPS respondents who answered the happiness 
question. A large number of predictor variables capture individuals‟ life 
circumstances (age, ethnicity, state of health, marital status and family 
structure, educational attainment, labour force status, income, consumption of 
alcohol and tobacco). To the model are added indicator variables describing 
gambling behaviour. One of these variables represents a recreational gambler, 
defined as a past-year gambler who scored zero on the PGSI screen.16  The 
coefficient estimate on this variable is interpreted as the change in expected 
happiness score if the subject is a recreational gambler, rather than a non-
gambler in otherwise identical life circumstances (as captured by the control 
variables). 
In the male equation, the results indicate a statistically significant increase 
of just under 0.2 points on the happiness scale if the subject is a recreational 
gambler rather than a non-gambler. This is a non-trivial effect, close to that 
predicted by the model if the individual is moved from the mid- to the top-
tercile in the income distribution.  
In the female equation, this result is not replicated. There is no statistically 
significant difference between the happiness scores of recreational gamblers 
and non-gamblers, controlling for life circumstances. However, the paper 
reports supplementary analysis which reveals a similar positive effect as for 
men from a variable signifying a recreational gambler where bingo is included 
                                                     
16 
The paper also presents a model where gambler variables reflect scores on DSM-
IV. Results are similar.    




in the set of gambling activities in which the subject has engaged. Bingo, of 
course, is an activity which takes place in a conspicuously social environment. 
Controlling for life circumstances, the 394 female bingo players in question 
are happier than female non-gamblers and the difference is statistically 
significant.     
The results reported by Forrest are evidence of a positive association 
between wellbeing and „responsible‟ engagement in gambling. However, 
although there are prior reasons for suspecting that recreational gambling 
promotes wellbeing, the statistical model is not capable of testing the 
proposition. It shows association rather than causation. For example, the 
positive association might arise because there are unobserved personality 
characteristics which affect both happiness and participation in gambling. To 
illustrate, extroversion may promote happiness and extroverts may be more 
likely to go out gambling. This would yield positive correlation such as is 
observed in the data. The positive correlation does not therefore demonstrate 
causation (though neither does it rule out). Nevertheless that recreational 
gamblers, a large majority of all gamblers, appear to enjoy elevated wellbeing 
is interesting and there would be a degree of risk in policies that reduced their 
ability to engage in gambling: the risk is that intervening to modify actions 
which are associated with elevated wellbeing might prevent that level of 
wellbeing from continuing to be achieved. 
Humphreys et al. (2011) focused on physical rather than mental 
wellbeing. They employed data from the Canadian Community Health Survey 
to explore the relationship between physical health and engagement in 
recreational gambling. Physical health was defined by whether an individual 
reported suffering from five common disorders (heart disease, high blood 
pressure, diabetes, mood disorder, anxiety disorder). Presence of each 
disorder was in turn modelled as dependent on a range of variables reflecting 
life circumstances, together with an indicator variable signifying a past-year 
gambler who had no positive endorsements on the problem gambling screen 
included in the Survey. The screen was the Canadian Problem Gambling 
Index (of which the PGSI screen administered in the BGPS is a derivation). 
Prior reasoning cannot predict the sign of any relationship between 
physical health and engagement in responsible gambling. For example, 
gambling may harm physical health if it often takes place at unsocial hours 
(too many late nights) or in conjunction with unhealthy behaviours such as 
drinking or smoking. On the other hand, it may release tension and alleviate 
stress, known risk factors for, for example, high blood pressure. It may even, 
as noted above, increase mental wellbeing; and elevated happiness is a 
negative predictor of future mortality and morbidity (see references above). 
So, the matter can be settled only empirically. Unlike Forrest (2013), 
Humphreys et al. are able to attempt to estimate causation (from gambling 
behaviour to health outcome) rather than just association. This they can do 
because Canadian data are drawn from provinces with sharply differing levels 
of provision of gambling. Essentially, their sophisticated econometric models 
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exploit a natural experiment where different individuals in the sample are 
exposed to varying levels of accessibility to gambling. Accessibility affects 
participation decisions, overcoming the problem that, otherwise, the factors 
other than life circumstances that influence participation are individual-
specific, unobserved personality variables that are likely to influence the 
outcome variable directly. 
Humphreys et al. find zero relationship between heart disease and 
engagement in recreational gambling. However, they find recreational 
gambling to be a statistically significant negative risk factor in the models for 
high blood pressure, diabetes, mood disorder and anxiety disorder. The size of 
the predicted reduction in the probability of suffering high blood pressure is 
particularly high. The findings must be treated with a degree of caution to the 
extent that estimates of the effects of recreational gambling prove very 
sensitive to detailed decisions on model specification. Nevertheless, this is the 
first study of the health benefits of recreational gambling and the results 
certainly point to hitherto undetected benefits from responsible gambling. 
The two papers discussed in this section are pioneering in the context of 
the gambling literature. Wellbeing is though becoming a focus of study of 
other areas where consumption choices relate to goods about which there are 
public health concerns. For example, Odermatt and Stutzer (2012) employ 21 
years of data from 40 European countries to examine the impact on life 
satisfaction of policies to deter smoking (price increases and restrictions on 
smoking in public places). Clearly there is considerable scope for more 
research into the effects of gambling policy on wellbeing. This will be 
facilitated if gambling prevalence surveys in other jurisdictions than Britain 
introduce wellbeing questions. This might well enable causation to be settled 
in countries where there is significant spatial variation in the availability of 
gambling services. 
                               
2.6 Conclusions 
 
Very many people in Britain participate in gambling without any signs of 
dysfunctional behaviour. The application of the well established methodology 
of welfare economics demonstrates that their freedom to choose to gamble 
enables them to gain substantial consumption benefit. Early work in a newer 
tradition (wellbeing research) suggests that recreational gamblers enjoy 
enhanced mental and physical wellbeing, though of course more studies need 
to be done.  
When decisions are taken in the area of regulation of gambling, a 
precautionary principle may often be proposed: restrictions should be 
continued, introduced or extended if there is a possibility that the liberal 
option would raise harm from problem gambling. But caution also needs to be 
exercised to the extent that most gamblers behave responsibly and enjoy high 
consumption benefit and (possibly) enhanced wellbeing. Restrictions on their 
choices run the risk that some of the considerable benefits they derive from 




gambling may be lost. All decisions need to take into account potential 
impacts on the benefits as well as on the costs of gambling.  
 
3 THE NATURE AND SCALE OF THE COSTS FROM 
GAMBLING 
 
3.1 Flawed decision-taking 
 
So far, the Report has accentuated the positive. The bulk of the analysis 
has drawn on traditional welfare economics, where individuals are assumed to 
make rational and well-informed decisions on how to maximise the 
satisfaction they derive from their incomes. If that is the starting-point, it is 
almost axiomatic that allowing them to make their own choices, 
unconstrained by regulatory restrictions, will raise their welfare. 
However, to most people, it seems obvious that some gamblers make 
consumption choices that are demonstrably self-harming (and harmful also for 
their families). Such „problem‟ or „irresponsible‟ gambling is associated with 
adverse outcomes including financial stress, break-down of family 
relationships, loss of employment, engagement in fraud, and even elevated 
suicide risk. The proportion of gamblers classified as problem gamblers is 
small; but the severity of the consequences may be high in the typical case, 
meaning that the gambling sector may generate high economic and social cost 
as well as high economic and social benefit. 
The adverse outcomes and high costs can originate only with flawed 
decision-taking by some gamblers. In traditional welfare economics, 
individuals are presumed to be „rational‟. But, in economics generally, interest 
has been increasing in why and how individuals come to make series of bad 
decisions which later they will regret. Consideration of this contemporary 
literature should allow insights to be gained into the root causes of the 
economic and social costs of gambling. 
The majority of work on why rationality may „fail‟ and why large 
numbers of consumers may make „bad‟ choices has been conducted within the 
specialism of health economics, most frequently in the context of decision-
taking about drinking, smoking and the eating of high-calorie, high-fat food. 
A valuable survey is provided by Cawley and Rhum (2011) and the ideas 
explored in their paper appear readily transferable to the context of gambling. 
Of course, it is not axiomatic that it is a „wrong‟ decision to choose a risky 
and unhealthy pattern of consumption. For example, choosing to smoke would 
appear to be rational if a fully informed individual had evaluated the value of 
the pleasure derived as greater than the expected health cost. There would be 
no obvious case for public intervention to influence such decisions other than 
for government to ensure that consumers took them with full information. In 
the case of smoking, health risks have been very well known for several 
decades. Indeed, Viscusi (1990) found that a large majority of smokers 
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considerably overestimated the health risks.17 Therefore, while provision of 
full information is a legitimate responsibility of government in the sense that 
information is a public good (i.e. there would be no incentive for others to 
provide it), it should not be presumed that individuals will then make 
decisions which others view as sensible or which policy makers had intended. 
Adherence to traditional welfare economics, where an individual is presumed 
to be the best judge of his own interests, would suggest that individuals, once 
provided with relevant information, should then be left to make their own 
choices, whatever others think about whether they are „sensible‟. This is the 
„liberal‟ model and points to narrow regulation where the role of the regulator 
is simply to provide information and ensure that the consumer is not misled. 
But regulation of gambling goes much beyond this, in the direction of 
more paternalistic and prescriptive regulation. If regulation is intended to be 
in the public interest18, the implication is that policy makers must feel 
implicitly that traditional welfare economics is based on an inadequate 
representation of consumer decision-taking. In the last decade or two, there 
have been attempts to modify traditional analysis to allow for the possibility 
of inconsistent decision-taking by individuals; and there have been more 
radical challenges from the new sub-disciplines of behavioural economics and 
neuroeconomics.  Another strand of writing is termed prospect theory and this 
may be viewed as an application of behavioural economics in the particular 
context of decisions involving risk taking. It therefore has particular relevance 
to analysis of gambling. 
Clearly limitations of space preclude attempting a complete review here of 
the evolution of relevant thinking in microeconomics.19  But, in summary, it 
would be fair to say that a common theme in the different revisionist ideas is 
the notion of time-inconsistent preferences. In an adaptation of traditional 
welfare economics, some individuals may behave as if applying hyperbolic 
discounting to their decision-taking, i.e they understand the importance of 
future consequences but, at the instance of taking each decision, they give 
temporarily great weight to the satisfaction to be obtained today compared to 
satisfaction in the future.20 In behavioural economics, Thaler and Shefrin 
                                                     
17 
This carries the apparently perverse implication that smoking rates are lower than 
would be socially optimal! 
18
 Economists have noted that not all regulation is necessarily motivated by a wish to 
serve the public interest. Regulatory capture is a concept which proposes that 
industries themselves seek regulation because it serves their interests, for example by 
introducing barriers to new entry. Thus, in the gambling sector, incumbents may 
lobby for restrictions on new gambling activities that would be competitive with 
existing products. 
19
 Again, the interested reader is referred to Cawley and Ruhm (2011). 
20
 For example, an individual may decide that the expected costs of smoking exceed 
the expected benefit of smoking and therefore decides to give up from tomorrow 
morning: future health costs count sufficiently in the decision that they outweigh the 
valuation of present pleasure. But when tomorrow becomes today, pleasure today is 




(1981) thought of decision-taking as involving a battle between two selves, a 
farsighted planner (who gives due weight to the future) and a myopic doer 
(who seeks immediate pleasure). In Lowenstein (2000) too is the notion that 
individuals know what long-term decisions would serve their interests- but 
they are blown off-course by immediate decisions being driven by emotion 
experienced in the heat of the moment (and possibly created in part by cues, 
such as the tempting whiff of hot doughnuts or, one might say, the clatter of 
coins falling from a slot machine). In neuroeconomics, Brocas and Carrillo 
(2008) linked long-term rational planning and short-term impulsive decisions 
to activities in different parts of the brain, where rational planning takes place 
in the neocortex but the limbic system responds to external cues without 
accounting for long-term consequences. The limbic system responds to cues 
before information is processed in the neocortex, so that some decisions get 
taken on the basis of emotion rather than rationality, again yielding sets of 
decisions that the individual will later recognise to have been „wrong‟. In 
prospect theory, a particular cognitive failure is loss aversion where 
individuals‟ decisions are strongly influenced by negative emotion from 
having lost wealth. For example, aversion to loss may cause an individual to 
carry on playing after losing money even though his prior plan had been to 
leave the casino once any loss reached the figure he could afford to lose 
(Barberis, 2012). 
These ideas may have universal applicability. In everyone there may be a 
tension between a rational self and a self focused on the pleasure of the 
moment. But of course most people do not get obese and most users of 
alcohol and gambling services do not consume to the point of self-harm. One 
idea running through the various strands in the literature is that many or most 
individuals appreciate the dangers of lack of self-control in immediate 
decision-taking and their rational selves respond by identifying and 
implementing effective pre-commitment strategies. For example, if I find 
chocolate too alluring, I may choose to purchase only one bar in my weekly 
shop rather than maintain a more generous inventory which may be consumed 
in a binge in the heat of the moment. Similarly those who understand that self-
control may be lost in the casino might decline to attend at all or else take 
with them only a limited amount of money (and no bank card). 
There may also be social responses in terms of promoting pre-
commitment. Cervallati and Vanin (2013) interpret the (costly) inculcation of 
religious and moral values into children as a response by parents to awareness 
of the danger that individuals will commit opportunistic crime in the heat of 
the moment despite the risk of later, severe negative consequences. Similarly, 
adherence to a faith which prohibits particular „vices‟ (such as alcohol or 
gambling) could be interpreted as a form of pre-commitment to zero or 
moderate consumption. In a secular age, regulation may serve the same 
                                                                                                                              
given great weight so that quitting is postponed one further day (and subsequently 
indefinitely). The individual fails to bring his or her long-term plans to realisation.   
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function of helping people take decisions that their rational selves would 
favour. One form of regulation is prohibition; but current regulatory thinking 
in gambling draws more explicitly on ideas around pre-commitment by 
favouring facilities for individual gamblers to exclude themselves from 
particular venues or to set loss limits prior to the start of a gambling session. 
Such options may provide more effective pre-commitment strategies than 
were previously available to gamblers sufficiently self-aware to appreciate the 
risk that they will deviate from long-term plans in the heat of the moment.21  
The theoretical framework around the notion of time-inconsistent 
preferences provides a rationale for why gambling yields harm to individuals 
who fail to recognise, or fail to cope with, the potential for repeated 
consumption decisions over time to lead to harmful outcomes. Of course, the 
proportion of gamblers whose behaviour is evidently self-harmful appears 
from prevalence surveys to be low. But the harm may be great and the 
following sections investigate the scale of the harm.  
 
3.2  Attempts to measure the economic and social costs of gambling 
 
There have been a number of attempts to monetise the harm that 
dysfunctional gambling imposes on society (though no systematic research 
exists in the case of Great Britain). For example, Australian Productivity 
Commission (2010) estimated national economic and social costs from 
problem gambling in a one year period in 2008-9 as in the range AUD4.7b- 
6.4b. This compared with an estimate of benefits from gambling (principally 
consumer surplus, but also including tax revenue, which may be interpreted as 
consumer surplus transferred from consumers to government) of AUD12.1b- 
15.8b.22 
It may be noted from this study not just that aggregate social cost is far 
below aggregate social benefit but also that, proportionately, the estimate of 
cost is presented with a much wider range than that of benefit. This reflects 
the conceptual and practical difficulties encountered in attempting to measure 
social cost. In fact, the Australian Productivity Commission could have 
considerably widened the range of its estimates had it allowed for the full 
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 Barberis (2011) notes that pre-commitment facilities may induce additional visits to 
casinos by prospective gamblers who had been sufficiently sophisticated to appreciate 
the risks but who had not successfully identified pre-commitment strategies of their 
own. 
22
 Reith (2004) noted that it is generally considered that the Reports from the 
Australian Productivity Commission and from the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission in the United States, each published in 1999, represented the most 
authoritative assessments to date of the impact of gambling and problem gambling. 
The focus here is on the Australian evidence because it was updated in the 2010 
Report. The American study valued national problem gambling costs as USD4b but 
did not quantify benefits from gambling (Gerstein et al., 1999).    




diversity of methodologies proposed in the academic literature for evaluating 
the costs of problem gambling. 
A conference held in Whistler, British Columbia, in 2000 brought together 
academics from different disciplinary backgrounds to debate how to measure 
the cost of problem gambling. The papers from the conference, several of 
which were published in the Journal of Gambling Studies in 2003, reveal a 
striking lack of consensus over methodology that suggests caution in taking 
any purported estimates of social cost too literally. 
The archetypical study first identifies which costs should be counted, for 
example divorces „caused‟ by problem gambling.23 Second, it estimates the 
physical quantity of each supposed cost, for example the number of divorces 
caused by problem gambling in the particular jurisdiction in the particular 
year. Third, it allocates a money value to each incidence of that cost and 
multiplies it by the number of incidences (as estimated in step two). Finally, it 
aggregates across all such costs identified for inclusion in the study. 
The process requires multiple decisions about what costs are relevant and 
how to attribute a money value to each cost. Many of these decisions are 
controversial and tend to be systematically different according to the 
disciplinary perspective of the researcher, for example public health versus 
economics. Generally the Australian Productivity Commission estimates tend 
to be influenced strongly by economics, which perhaps at least makes for 
consistency given that its estimate of benefits was also based on classical 
principles of welfare economics. 
The potential for different researchers to produce estimates that may be 
orders of magnitude different from each other follows from a number of 
issues.  
First, it is debatable what should count as a social cost. Many harms fall 
on the problem gambler himself whereas classical welfare economics argues 
that these costs will already have been taken into account (internalised) in the 
gambler‟s willingness-to-pay (making the consumer surplus a net measure of 
satisfaction, which already accounts for expected harm). Again, economists 
define social cost as a reduction in societal wealth, such that, for example, 
money stolen by a problem gambler or bail out money given to him by his 
parents should not be counted a cost because the sum involved is transferred 
between members of society rather than lost to society (Walker and Barnett, 
1999).24   Researchers from other backgrounds may count amounts of theft 
and bail out costs as social costs in their analysis.        
                                                     
23
 Walker and Barnett (1999) provided a list of costs that had been featured in 
published studies up to the time of their article. 
24 
On the other hand, the cost of investigating fraud by a problem gambler and the 
costs of trying and incarcerating him should be counted as social cost. The sum of 
money stolen represents a transfer but the costs of law enforcement use up real 
resources, reducing societal wealth.   
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Second, it is debatable to what extent social costs associated with problem 
gambling are caused by gambling. At least as observed in the population of 
those in treatment, problem gamblers have a high propensity to suffer 
comorbidities. For example Australian Productivity Commission (2010, p. 
7.15) notes that, in a sample from the State of Victoria,  43% of subjects had 
at some time been diagnosed with anxiety problems, 55% with depression and 
29% with alcohol problems. 19% reported problems with other drugs. Given 
that problem gamblers may experience a range of problems, it is hard to 
separate out any influence from gambling behaviour and, for example, 
gambling may be an outlet in which the individual‟s negative script is played 
out (i.e he or she may have found another route to harm in the absence of the 
opportunity to gamble and the negative outcome should not necessarily be 
attributed to gambling). 
Third, it is very challenging to place money values on many of the 
negative outcomes associated with problem gambling, such as suicides or the 
emotional distress of family members. Of course, this general issue runs 
through cost-benefit analysis across government. If it is proposed to raise 
speed limits on motorways, there may be benefits in terms of time savings and 
costs in terms of extra fatalities. Both need to be monetised to enable benefits 
and costs to be compared with each other. But at least there are proxy markets 
where shadow valuations are revealed (there is a market for time savings 
embedded within markets for many convenience goods; and there is a market 
for fatality risk where high risk occupations must pay a premium to 
compensate for increased chances of death at work). The range of harms 
associated with problem gambling is though wider and consequently the task 
appears particularly intractable. The attribution of a money value to emotional 
distress is likely to involve the exercise of highly subjective judgements. 
Each of these issues gives considerable scope to researchers to exercise 
judgement in constructing their measure of social cost, with the risk that their 
own ideological perspectives may drive the results they report. Even where a 
study is conducted very objectively, it is inevitable that there is an extent to 
which many important underlying assumptions appear somewhat arbitrary. 
For example, the Australian Productivity Commission deals with the 
causation issue simply by discounting 20% of outcomes (for example, number 
of divorces per year) associated with problem gambling. 
The obstacles to credible estimation of social costs are still greater if the 
attempt is made to apply the methodology to particular gambling activities, 
such as electronic gaming machines. For example, international evidence 
consistently finds a particularly high prevalence of problem gambling among 
players of electronic gaming machines (Australian Productivity Commission, 
2010). In Britain, 13.3% of BGPS respondents who played fixed odds betting 
terminals in bookmaker shops at least monthly were classified as problem 
gamblers according to the DSM-IV screen (Wardle et al., 2011, Table 6.4). 
But the typical problem gambler who had played on machines in bookmaker 
shops had also taken part in multiple gambling activities (Wardle et al., 2013) 




and so it is problematic to attribute social costs of problem gambling 
specifically to the availability of these machines. When a new gambling 
opportunity arises, such as fixed odds betting machines in the early 2000s, it 
may not only displace expenditure from other forms of gambling but also 
displace problem gambling activity (Reith, 2004). It is therefore hard to 
establish whether there is additional harm from the specific, newly available 
activity.   
Given the conceptual difficulties, and the considerable resources which 
would be required, there would appear to be little case at present for 
proposing a study of aggregate monetised economic and social costs in Great 





As on the benefit side, an alternative approach to understanding the costs 
of gambling activity is to focus on wellbeing directly. As described earlier, 
Forrest (2013) exploits data from the BGPS to estimate a model to predict 
„happiness‟ on the basis of indicators for gambling behaviour (and a large 
number of variables capturing life circumstances). The results are strikingly 
illustrative of the very low wellbeing typically experienced by those who have 
trouble with their gambling behaviour. Whether working with the DSM-IV or 
the PGSI screen, classification as a problem gambler (controlling for variables 
capturing life circumstances) proves to have a very large and statistically 
significant negative impact on predicted happiness score, comparable with 
that from moving the subject from a state of “very good” to a state of “very 
bad” health. The probability that the subject‟s response places him or her in 
the bottom 15% of the population, ranked by happiness, is tripled. Further, 
particularly for women, a positive score on a screen (but below the threshold 
for classification as a problem gambler) has a lesser but still strong impact on 
the subject‟s expected wellbeing. And those who reported having a relative 
with a gambling problem also exhibited strikingly low levels of wellbeing. 
Together, all these findings suggest that problem gamblers and their families 
indeed represent a group in the population whose problems are very real and 
very serious. Moreover, the problems extend to “at risk” as well as “full 
blown” problem gamblers, raising the question of whether the published 
prevalence rate understates the extent of problem gambling by basing 
classification on too high a threshold score on the screen.  
Addressing social cost directly through measurement of wellbeing 
overcomes many of the problems associated with monetary evaluation of the 
economic and social cost of gambling.25 For example, it is not necessary to 
consider either how much strain problem gambling places on relationships or 
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Potentially it also offers a route to refining and improving measurement of problem 
gambling prevalence through the standard screens.   
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how these strains should be represented in terms of money. Instead one 
focuses on the end product, wellbeing itself. However, the wellbeing approach 
cannot resolve the issue of causation. The unhappiness of problem gamblers 
may be caused by their gambling. But, alternatively, both their unhappiness 
and their disordered pattern of gambling behaviour may have a common cause 
associated with unobserved (perhaps unobservable) personal characteristics: 
gambling behaviour may just be reflecting the fundamental problems in their 
lives that are making them unhappy.  
This is not to say that the findings of Forrest (2013) do not have important 
implications. First, whatever the source of their unhappiness, problem 
gamblers typically exhibit very substantially depressed wellbeing, comparable 
with people experiencing serious physical illness. This makes the case for 
allocating significant resources to diagnosis and to treatment (so long as 
treatment has been demonstrated to be effective). Generally across the World, 
including in Britain, provision of services in the area of problem gambling has 
been much more limited than should be expected given the very low 
wellbeing of problem gamblers. Second, problem gambling is relatively rare 
in the population and problem gamblers are therefore generally hard to reach 
and identify. But there is a concentration of problem gamblers in certain types 
of gambling venue, such as casinos and bookmaker shops. Given that problem 
gamblers are such a vulnerable group as demonstrated by their low level of 
wellbeing, there is an evident strong duty of care on operators to attempt to 
mitigate their problems. There is also an opportunity for regulators to reach 
out to problem gamblers and to try to help them through influencing the 
gaming environment.                  
 




The bulk of this Review has focused on attempts to evaluate the benefits 
and costs of gambling, whether by employment of the traditional tools of 
welfare economics or by application of the infant science of happiness studies. 
According to the authoritative work of the Australian Productivity 
Commission (1999 and 2010), economic and social benefits exceed economic 
and social costs by a considerable margin for commercial gambling 
considered in the aggregate though the balance of advantage is less clear-cut 
when electronic gaming machines (which are much less restricted in most of 
Australia than is the case in Great Britain) are considered separately. But this 
is evidence from just one country and discussion, above, of the 
methodological problems provides a clue as to why researchers have been shy 
of formally attempting to weigh benefits and costs in other jurisdictions. 
In a sense, it does not in fact matter that we cannot assess (using formal 
cost-benefit techniques) whether the gambling industries generate a net 
benefit for society in Great Britain. An answer would be needed only if 




prohibition were on the agenda, which it is not. Rather, policy debate focuses 
on marginal changes such as whether casinos should be permitted to have 
more gaming machines or whether stake limits should be varied for machines 
in bookmaker shops. Regulatory changes such as these are properly informed 
by considering marginal benefits and marginal costs rather than total benefits 
and total costs. 
But the long discussion above of total benefits and total costs did serve a 
purpose. It demonstrated something important and relevant to current policy 
formulation. Whatever the imprecision of the estimates, it is beyond doubt 
that both the money value of the consumption benefits of gambling and the 
money value of the economic and social costs associated with problem 
gambling are very substantial in absolute terms. Therefore, even if a policy 
change had a relatively low proportionate effect on the consumption benefit 
and a relatively low proportionate effect on the economic and social cost, the 
absolute value of these two effects may nevertheless each be large. Therefore 
it is important that any regulatory policy proposal should incorporate formal 
consideration of both the potential effect on consumption benefit and the 
potential effect on the harm from problem gambling. 
In assigning weights to the benefits and costs associated with any policy 
initiative, the regulatory regime will necessarily be influenced by its 
philosophy, and transparency perhaps demands that its philosophy be made 
explicit. This Review has established that gambling activity yields 
considerable economic and social value in terms of consumption benefit 
(entertainment). Because responsible participation in gambling is common, 
this benefit is dispersed across large numbers of the population.  It has also 
established that the potential harm from problem gambling is very high. But, 
in contrast to the benefit from gambling, this harm is concentrated on a 
relatively small number of people, problem gamblers (and of course their 
families, and perhaps others with whom they interact, such as in the 
workplace). Thus gambling benefits very many people, each by a little, and 
hurts a rather smaller number of people, but each by a lot. This generalisation 
is consistent with assessment either using traditional welfare economics tools 
or direct measurement of wellbeing. 
A libertarian perspective is that the state should not constrain the choices 
of the majority in order to protect a minority which appears to be subject to 
poor decision-taking. Reith (2004) cited a survey in Canada which had found 
that 63% agreed that gambling should not be curtailed, whatever its 
consequences.  By contrast, advocates of a paternalistic approach would be 
concerned to intervene to „protect‟ problem gamblers and might argue that it 
is they who should be the focus of policy because they tend to be 
disproportionately from disadvantaged groups, such as the poor and ethnic 
minorities (and, if not, become disadvantaged by virtue of the low wellbeing 
associated with gambling problems). Implicitly, the argument is that greater 
weights in decision rules should be assigned to benefits/ costs falling on the 
relatively few problem gamblers than to benefits/ costs falling on the many 
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recreational gamblers. The traditional welfare economics approach is not to 
ignore either benefits or costs and not to assign weights but simply to measure 
the prospective gains and losses from a policy and „approve‟ it if the projected 
gains exceed the projected losses. The identity of the gainers and losers is not 
taken into account. This is the most common approach in government to 
formulation of policy. It has the advantage of avoiding value judgements over 
the assignment of weights (albeit that setting all weights implicitly equal to 
one could itself be regarded as a value judgement). It is assumed below that 
this approach underpins how regulators approach decisions over policy in the 
sphere of gambling. 
         
4.2 Principles in policy formation 
 
Application of cost-benefit analysis of any proposed intervention would 
proceed by assessing: 
 
(a) the likely effect on the (considerable) entertainment value derived 
from gambling facilities by responsible gamblers; 
(b) the extent to which the (considerable) costs experienced by problem 
gamblers would be either mitigated or worsened; and 
(c) the resource costs involved in putting the intervention into practice. 
 
Given the conceptual problems discussed above, it is unlikely that precise 
monetary values could be placed on the three items in the cost-benefit 
analysis. Rather, judgements will have to be made about the orders of 
magnitude involved under each heading. But it is of course highly desirable 
that such judgements are informed by some evidence.26 
Some policies should be easy to approve. For example, regulators should 
strive to ensure that full information, in a form that is easy to understand, is 
provided regarding the games on offer: the chance of winning the jackpot, the 
typical cost of an hour‟s play, and so on. Since there is consistent evidence 
that a proportion of all gamblers, but especially problem gamblers, 
misunderstand some basic features of electronic gaming machines, additional 
information should help both responsible and problem gamblers to improve 
their decision-taking over how much and on what to gamble. And resource 
costs of supplying such information may be relatively low.  
In principle, provision of voluntary pre-commitment facilities should also 
be relatively uncontroversial. That such options should be available is 
supported by the theoretical framework employed above to account for flawed 
                                                     
26 
Without scientific evidence, policy is in danger of being driven by vested interests. 
For example, demands for more rigorous controls on one sector of the gambling 
industry may be made by a group set up purportedly in the public interest. It may use 
highly selective evidence and in reality it may represent another section of the 
gambling industry keen to limit competition.  




decision-taking by those whose gambling appears to be self-harming. The 
empirical evidence on the potential of appropriate facilities to mitigate 
problem gambling harm, though limited, is encouraging (see, for example, 
Ladouceur et al., 2012). Moreover, if setting limits on losses or length of 
playing time is voluntary, the choices of those who do not have problems with 
their gambling are not constrained and therefore they should be no worse off. 
Indeed, some may be better off: those who do not gamble, even though they 
would find it entertaining, because they fear that they would deviate from 
their planned level of spending once in the casino (Barberis, 2012).27  
While some possible regulatory interventions do not imply the need to 
trade-off between lower entertainment value and lower gambling harm, many 
potentially do. For example, most forms of restriction of choice, in terms of 
accessibility of venues, stake sizes, intensity of play, and so on, may offer 
some potential for mitigating harm from problem gambling but might well 
reduce the satisfaction of those who gamble without harm to themselves and 
others. 
Research on the effects of environmental and structural aspects of gaming 
on problem gambling is much more common than research on how these 
features affect the pleasure of recreational gamblers. There is therefore little 
prospect that a meaningful forecast could be made of how the demand curve 
for recreational gamblers would be shifted (and consumer surplus thereby 
changed) if, for example, stake limits were lowered on gaming machines. 
However, some basic relevant information could be obtained from 
relatively low cost research. Restricting the maximum stake further would in 
principle constrain choice and may make some recreational gamblers worse 
off (for example, it may be argued that some gamblers rationally choose to 
spend their gaming budget in quick spurts either because they are time poor or 
because a spin is more thrilling if more is at stake). However, it is quite 
possible that such restrictions would be non-binding on almost all of them 
because hardly any choose currently to stake above the level of the proposed 
new restriction. In this case, it would be likely that the reduction in maximum 
stake would be justified (on the ground that entertainment value would not fall 
by much) if it could be shown to be likely to help some problem gamblers.28 
This is a possibility; but research has not yet gathered information on stake 
                                                     
27
 There is though a potential for some loss of entertainment value if the pre-
commitment scheme is very rigorous. For example, it may be more effective if 
spending limits are binding at all venues and this would imply a need for playing 
machines to require a player card or some other means of identifying players, such as 
fingerprint recognition (Reith, 2004). Taken to this degree, schemes may deter 
„recreational players‟ from participating at all; and resource costs for the industry 
might also be high. 
28
 It would be relevant for researchers to consider whether restrictions might be 
ineffective in terms of harm reduction- for example, if restrictions introduced in land 
venues just shifted problematic behaviour to the e-gaming sector. 
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patterns among current players and so policy makers face making choices 
uninformed by even basic evidence. 
This general lack of evidence pervades discussion of most policy 
proposals to tackle problem gambling because such a wide range of options 
for trying to mitigate harm appear likely to involve a trade-off between this 
policy goal and the second goal of allowing responsible consumers to 
maximise consumption benefits from gambling.29  In one sense the trade-offs 
preclude the achievement of both goals and cost-benefit analysis in some form 
is required where there are such trade-offs. 
The policy dilemma reflects in fact a general proposition from 
mathematical economics (which has a proof analogous to that taught to high 
school students to justify the rule that the solution of simultaneous equations 
requires the number of unknowns to match the number of equations to be 
solved). The theory states that if there are n policy goals, they can be achieved 
only if there are n policy instruments available. Here there are two policy 
goals but essentially only one policy instrument (restriction) is typically 
considered. A new policy instrument might have the potential to allow both 
goals to be achieved or at least to make trade-offs between the interests of 
recreational and problem gamblers less acute.   
 
4.3 Can trade-offs be avoided? 
 
Restrictions often imply trade-offs because they affect both recreational 
and problem gamblers. A promising line of thought, supported by the 
National Responsible Gambling Strategy in Great Britain, is to pursue more 
targeted interventions to address the problems of current and potential 
problem gamblers. If these are viewed as a second policy instrument, and if 
they are expected to be effective, restrictions could then be set „low‟ (to allow 
the potential entertainment value from responsible gambling to be maximised) 
while targeted interventions would serve to minimise harm associated with 
less healthy gambling behaviour. 
There is an insufficient evidence base for applying this general strategy at 
present. However, a programme of research proposed by the Responsible 
Gambling Trust has high potential for settling many of the relevant questions. 
Targeted intervention is most feasible in machine gaming to the extent that 
gaming is based on technology and the research programme will examine 
whether the technology can be exploited to identify where a player is 
engaging in risky behaviour associated with problem gambling. For example, 
a pattern of risky behaviour might trigger such as warning messages, 
                                                     
29
 Another example relates to audio-visual features of machines. These may serve as 
cues which stimulate the tendency of the vulnerable to lose control of their spending 
(for evidence, see Wardle, 2013); but they may also serve to make the experience of 
„responsible‟ players more satisfying by adding to the excitement.     




reminders of the amount lost, advice on seeking help or even an enforced 
break in play.30    
The data base for this programme of research will be industry records of 
play on machines within their estate. One obstacle to the research is that only 
patterns of play within a session will be observed and not who is playing and 
whether their past history of play appears problematic. Even where the player 
is known (for example, if he or she used a loyalty card), there will be no direct 
information on whether or not he or she is a problem gambler. Reliance will 
have to be placed on following consensual views from past research on what 
patterns of play constitute reliable markers for problem gambling. 
Any system based on algorithms for applying targeted interventions will 
require a view to be taken on its propensity to generate false negatives and 
false positives. A high frequency of false positives would undermine the 
potential of the approach to help problem gamblers without the need to spoil 
the enjoyment of other gamblers, whose enjoyment might, for example, be 
affected by what they regarded as hectoring messages. On the other hand, 
field trials might investigate whether those who received interventions 
reported that their experience was in fact spoiled. 
Another issue is that the algorithms could be made less blunt if they could 
distinguish between isolated and repeated cases of engagement in a risky 
pattern of play. Perhaps most regular players chase losses and lose more than 
they could afford at least occasionally. But many would question whether the 
state (represented by regulation) should intervene to protect a player whenever 
he or she transgresses its norms. To an extent, it could be argued that 
individuals should be left alone to learn from their own mistakes. The degree 
of harm from losing more than one can afford is unlikely to be large from a 
single occasion. But repeated risky behaviour typical of problem gamblers 
does carry a high probability of serious harm and intervention could then be 
argued to be more obviously justifiable. On the other hand, if the algorithms 
were to be able to identify patterns of repeated risky or reckless behaviour, 
information on who was playing would be required and this would imply that 
all players would have to be registered, something casual players might 
hesitate to do because of inconvenience or concerns over privacy. 
Investigation of the feasibility of shifting the balance of harm 
minimisation strategy away from restrictions and towards targeted 
interventions is therefore likely to encounter some practical obstacles to be 
overcome. Nevertheless it appears the most promising avenue for regulators 
                                                     
30
 Alternatively the player could be „nudged‟ towards a break by provision of a 
refreshment voucher. The potentially beneficial role of a break is supported by the 
theoretical framework since it removes the player from his „hot‟ state, allowing time 
for his rational self to take control. The introduction of smoking bans in many 
jurisdictions may have been helpful because they enforced a quasi-compulsory break 
on some players. In New Zealand, a smoking ban was followed by a significant fall in 
calls to problem gambling help lines.  
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to explore given the essential policy dilemma that many possibilities for 
addressing problem gambling involve restrictions which incidentally reduce 
the ability of responsible individuals to choose to maximise the satisfaction 
they derive from their income by allocating an appropriate part of it to 




1. Gambling is a popular leisure activity in Great Britain, at least as 
popular as such pastimes as attending the cinema. The proportion of gamblers 
who show any signs of problematic behaviour is low though the proportion of 
gamblers classified as problem or at-risk gamblers is higher for some 
branches of the industry than others, including in the slot machines sector. 
2. Gambling in general and machine gaming in particular employ 
significant numbers of people. All gambling together contributes roughly 0.6 
percent of GDP, making it a moderately important industry. However, its 
influence at the macroeconomic level is likely to be very limited to the extent 
that it simply displaces activity in other entertainment sectors. 
3. Its value therefore lies not in its contribution to total employment or 
output but rather in the fact that its existence allows greater choice in how 
people allocate their leisure budgets. The majority of gamblers behave 
responsibly and it would be conventional to say that their choice to gamble 
implies that they derive more satisfaction from their limited budgets when 
they spend part of their income on gambling. 
4. Economists traditionally measure consumption benefit by estimating 
consumer surplus. The technique was applied rigorously to the case of 
gambling in two reports by the Australian Productivity Commission. No 
similarly rigorous analysis has been conducted in Great Britain but rough 
calculations show a consumption value for Britain equivalent to the benefit 
from every household in the country receiving extra disposable income of £75 
per year. In addition, further consumption value is created but transferred to 
government through specific duties on gambling. 
5. Economic and social costs of gambling fall mainly on problem 
gamblers and their families. Valuation of the annual costs is fraught with 
conceptual and practical difficulties. Best estimates for Australia are that costs 
are substantial but below consumption benefit, by a wide margin for most 
forms of gambling but by a much narrower margin in the case of machine 
gaming. Similar research has not been conducted in Great Britain. 
6. The last edition of the British Gambling Prevalence Survey included a 
question to elicit a self-evaluation of wellbeing. Recreational gamblers prove 
to be a little happier than non-gamblers but problem gamblers exhibit 
exceptionally low levels of wellbeing comparable to those found amongst 
victims of serious illness. Statistical modelling is unable to establish causation 
but the pattern is consistent with evidence (points 4 and 5 above) that 
aggregate benefits and costs from gambling are each very substantial, though 




dispersed amongst many people in the first case and concentrated in relatively 
few in the latter case. 
7. Because both benefits and costs are large, even if hard to measure, 
proposals to change regulatory rules should consider both the effects on the 
consumption value of responsible gamblers and the effects on the harm 
associated with problem gambling. 
8. Some policy interventions offer the possibility of mitigating harm 
without constraining the choices of responsible gamblers. Others may be 
shown, were appropriate research to be conducted, to have high potential for 
harm reduction but limited potential to affect choices made by responsible 
gamblers. On the other hand, a wide range of policy options require a trade-
off between the goals of maximising the entertainment value of recreational 
gamblers and minimising harm to problem gamblers and their families. 
9. One strategy is to try to avoid the need to confront trade-offs by 
adopting few blanket restrictions on gambling choices while seeking to target 
harm mitigation measures explicitly at problem gamblers. In machine gaming, 
current research programmes seek to create algorithms that would identify 
patterns of behaviour associated with self-harming play and trigger on-screen 
interventions such as information, advice or enforcement of a break from 
play. The success of the approach would depend on how successful it proved 
to be in avoiding false negatives and false positives as well as on how 
effective interventions were in modifying behaviour.  
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